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5.1  Introduction 
In the early stage of  Korea’s development, the nation’s growth depended 
heavily on strong government leadership because of a lack of both know-how 
and risk-taking entrepreneurs. The demand of the people for the government 
to  make  greater development efforts legitimized an  interventionist policy. 
Thus, the Korean government took the lead in development. 
The Korean tax system, which contains a rich assortment of  policy tools, 
has  been  used  in  almost all kinds of  government development efforts. Tax 
tools,  however,  have  not  been  very  effective in  carrying out the intended 
goals. First, in the earlier stages of development, the Korean market did not 
function well enough for price incentives to operate efficiently. The govem- 
ment’s extensive intervention was one of the major reasons for this problem. 
Second, tax administration was inefficient. Third, the level of taxpayer com- 
pliance has been very low.  For these reasons, despite the extensive and fre- 
quent manipulation of  the tax  system, the Korean government has not de- 
pended heavily on these tools in a practical sense. Rather, financial policy has 
been employed more effectively. 
Politically and economically, Korea  is now  at a crossroads. Many  new 
problems threaten to hinder Korea’s economic  growth. Korea’s  successful 
export-led growth, producing substantial balance-of-payments surpluses, has 
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elicited friction and growing protectionism from its trading partners. In addi- 
tion, imbalances in regional, sectoral, and urban and rural development have 
been exacerbated, which has resulted in increasing income disparities, a ma- 
jor source of discontent and social conflict. With the process of democratiza- 
tion, the pent-up discontent of  the past decades has emerged in the form of 
social conflicts and disorder, thus posing a major obstacle to further develop- 
ment. 
Tax  policy, as part of the growth-oriented strategies of  the past, has been 
partially responsible for bringing about these problems. In the future, Korea’s 
tax policy  should aim not only for sustained economic growth but also for 
correction of disparities that exist among various economic and social sectors. 
To  redress such imbalances, which arose from the government’s long neglect 
of social development, there is a strong need for redirection of tax policy. 
This paper presents an overview of some of the current tax reform issues in 
Korea. We  first briefly review the historical changes in Korean tax policy and 
the tax structure. Next, we outline the current tax system and structure and 
identify a few important structural problems with the system. Finally, we dis- 
cuss current tax reform issues and the tax  reforms to be carried out in the 
coming years. 
5.2  A Historical Overview of Korean Tax  Policy and Reform 
Almost every year since the establishment of  the government in 1948, the 
tax system has changed. The reforms of  1961, 1967, 1971, 1976, and 1982 
were carried out on a larger scale than other reforms and were directly linked 
to Korea’s five-year economic development plans. In other words, Korean tax 
policy has been an integral part of the country’s economic development policy. 
Therefore, in spite of the repeated citation of equity objectives, efficiency ob- 
jectives have dominated in practically all these reforms. As noted above, only 
recently have equity issues been seriously discussed in relation to tax reform. 
5.2.1  The Preindustrialization Period (1948-61) 
The Republic of  Korea was formed in  1948, and a set of  tax laws were 
enacted that same year. Previously, the U.S. military regime used a partially 
revised version of  a wartime tax system that had been taken over from the 
Japanese colonial government. The new system, which was embodied in eigh- 
teen tax laws, included income tax, corporate tax, liquor tax, inheritance tax, 
commodity taxes, and other minor taxes. It was the first modem and demo- 
cratic tax system introduced in Korea. One of  its notable characteristics was 
the shift in the taxation target from the rural landlord class to the wealthy 
urban class. 
The new system was completely disrupted by the Korean War during 1950- 
53.  By that time, policymakers had also become aware of administrative dif- 
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can be characterized  as reflecting these administrative considerations and as 
attempting to replace the wartime emergency system with a normalized one. 
Around  the  end of  the  1950s, the government’s  policy  emphasis partially 
shifted from rehabilitation  and  reconstruction  to industrialization  and  eco- 
nomic growth. Tax policy,  accordingly, began  to emphasize incentive mea- 
sures to promote capital formation and exports. 
5.2.2  The Period of  Export-oriented  Industrialization (1961-70) 
Rapid economic growth in Korea began in the early 1960s, when the mili- 
tary  government  that  came to  power  in  1961 launched  an  organized  and 
single-minded policy on  industrialization.  The new government had to solve 
several problems before it could promote its ambitious plan to push the econ- 
omy out of  the quagmire of  poverty.  First, fiscal difficulties arose from the 
drastic reduction of  foreign aid, which had formerly served to meet a consid- 
erable portion of the government’s fiscal budget.  Other financial sources for 
investment in the Korean economy had to be found. The economy faced the 
typical problem of a lack of domestic savings to finance investment and a lack 
of  foreign  exchange to  import capital  goods.  In  addition,  the  government 
wanted to carry out its investment  projects directly,  in  order to combat the 
severe deficiency of  social overhead capital.  Naturally, the goal of a new tax 
policy would be to maximize revenue and to encourage savings and foreign 
exchange earnings. 
To maximize revenue,  a crucial administrative reform  was implemented, 
the establishment of  the  Office of  National  Tax  Administration  (ONTA) in 
1966. The military government diagnosed correctly that the problem was not 
in the system of taxation as legally defined but in the implementation of  the 
system. Before the  establishment  of  ONTA, some measures  were taken  to 
ensure the enforcement of tax laws. These measures included simplifying tax 
administration, intensifying the punishment  for tax delinquency, and provid- 
ing incentives for bookkeeping and voluntary compliance.  I 
To promote private saving and investment, capital taxation was drastically 
reduced.  In particular, interest income was almost untaxed, a law guarantee- 
ing the anonymity of bank accounts was passed in the early 1960s, and official 
interest rates for deposits were raised dramatically in the mid-1960s. On the 
investment side, the definition of “key and strategic industries” in which firms 
were eligible for quite liberal tax holidays was expanded. 
During this period, income generated from foreign exchange-earning activ- 
ity  was taxed at a preferential  rate, that is, 50 percent  of  the normal  rate. 
Previously, the preferential reduction rates were 30 percent for exports and 20 
I. For example, ONTA introduced a new “green-return system” (so named for the color of the 
return form) under which firms and individuals file their tax returns on a self-assessment basis 
rather than having tax officials prepare returns. Taxpayers who kept satisfactory accounting re- 
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percent  for  other foreign  exchange  earnings,  such as tourism  and  sales of 
goods and services to the foreign military forces stationed in Korea. 
Most of the above reforms  were made in  1961. In  1967, the urgency of 
securing tax revenue somewhat relaxed. Hence, more or less “sophisticated’ 
goals were set. A global income tax system with progressive rates was par- 
tially  introduced,  and  the exemption  level for wage  and  salary earners in- 
creased. An important change in the corporate tax system was the introduction 
of rates that discriminated between “open” corporations and closely held cor- 
porations, to encourage the opening of corporations and to foster the domestic 
capital market. 
5.2.3  The Period of Heavy Industrialization  (1971-79) 
The first phase of  economic development through export-oriented  indus- 
trialization  was  extremely  successful,  and  the  government  ambitiously 
planned to proceed to the second phase, in which the self-reliance of the econ- 
omy was to be emphasized.  The term “self-reliance” can mean many things. 
In this case, it meant national security and specifically included self-sufficient 
production of the main staple crop (rice) and a more balanced and developed 
industrial  structure.  Reaching a better balance in the industrial  structure re- 
quired an expansion of the heavy and chemical industries. This expansion was 
pursued excessively, however, and created many problems toward the end of 
the 1970s. 
From the early  1970s onward, tax reforms reflected an increasing concern 
for redistribution. This change in tax policy direction seems to have reflected 
in part the increased capacity of the economy to pursue equity goals and in 
part a political calculation aimed at pacifying the public, which was growing 
increasingly restive under the prolonged dictatorship. 
Two very  important  tax  reforms  were carried  out in the  mid-1970s.  By 
then, the tax system was in tatters, perhaps due to frequent ad hoc revisions 
geared to many specific objectives. The dual structure of the personal income 
tax system,  for example, was administratively  inefficient and promoted  nei- 
ther horizontal  nor vertical equity in distributing the tax burden. The system 
of indirect taxes was even more complicated. Korea had both excise and tum- 
over taxes with more than fifty rates, ranging from 0.5 to 300 percent. This 
background led to a strong desire to streamline and simplify the overall tax 
structure, not only for administrative efficiency but also for greater tax burden 
equity and neutrality  with respect to resource allocation.  Specifically, an al- 
most global personal income tax was introduced by the reform in 1974 (imple- 
mented  in  1975), and a consumption-type value-added tax (VAT) and set of 
special excise taxes replaced the business tax (a turnover tax) and seven other 
indirect taxes as a result of the 1976 tax reform (effective in 1977).’ To com- 
pensate for the possible adverse effects of  the newly introduced  VAT  and to 
2.  The seven taxes included commodities, textile products, petroleum products, electricity and 
gas, transportation, admission, and entertainment. 121  Tax Reform in Korea 
soothe political  tension  due to  its  introduction,  the  government introduced 
additional income tax relief for low- to middle-income workers, certain con- 
cessions for taxes on inheritance and land sales, and more generous deprecia- 
tion allowances. In short, the reforms of 1974 and 1976 determined the basic 
structure of the current tax system in Korea. 
Another significant change in the tax system in the seventies was the intro- 
duction of  the defense tax, surcharged on various taxes at rates of 0.2 to 30 
percent. This tax was introduced as a temporary earmarked levy with an ex- 
piry date of 1980, but its expiration was postponed twice, until 1990. It gen- 
erated a considerable amount of revenue, at the cost of adding a fair number 
of complications to the tax system. 
The essential  part of  the tax  policy  in  this period,  as noted  earlier,  was 
unreserved  support for heavy and chemical industries. Various types of  gen- 
erous tax incentives were legislated, mainly through the Tax Exemption and 
Reduction Control Law enacted in 1965. The so-called key industries, which 
included shipbuilding,  machinery,  basic metals, petrochemicals,  automotive 
products,  electronics,  and  chemical  fertilizers,  were  extremely  favorably 
treated in terms of corporate or proprietors’ income taxation. 
From  the  early  1970s, incentives  for  heavy  industrialization  were  rein- 
forced, while  incentives for export industries were  drastically  red~ced.~  In 
1974, all major incentives for promoting key industries were unified and rear- 
ranged under “special tax treatment for key industries” in the Tax Exemption 
and Reduction Control Law. This “special treatment” included three optional 
sets of incentives-tax  holidays, investment tax credit, and special deprecia- 
tion-to  qualified firms in selected heavy and chemical industries.4 
A quantitative summary of the incentives extended to key industries during 
the period  from 1963 to  1985 is presented in table 5.1. According to these 
estimates, during the second half of the  1970s as much as 37 percent of in- 
vestment at margin was given to investors in eligible key industries in the form 
of tax privileges. 
5.2.4  The Structural Adjustment and Liberalization Period (198047) 
Dramatic changes in the economic and political environment led to a drastic 
readjustment of development policy objectives in the early 1980s. The role of 
the market mechanism in resource allocation was emphasized in order to com- 
bat some of the conspicuous structural difficulties in those heavy and chemical 
industries that had been carefully tended by the government. Hence, liberali- 
zation in  various  areas, such as foreign trade,  foreign  and overseas invest- 
ment, and financial markets, was sought. On the other hand, to overcome the 
macroeconomic crisis of  1980, a series of strong stabilization policy measures 
3.  The 50 percent reduced rate of corporate or proprietors’ tax on income from foreign ex- 
changeearning activity was discontinued in 1973 and a couple of tax-free reserve systems, whose 
incentive effects were much smaller compared with the previous system’s, were introduced. See 
Kwack (1986) for a discussion of the incentive effects of this change. 
4. See Choi et at. (1985) for a detailed discussion on the tax incentives for key industries. 122  Taewon Kwack and Kye-Sik Lee 
Table 5.1  Benefits from Tax Incentives for Investment in Machinery by Firms 
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9.6 (  9.6) 
5.2 (  5.2) 
5.0 (  5.2) 
Source: Kwack (1986, 82). 
Nores: Figures in parentheses represent the benefit of  investment made on domestically produced 
machinery. Incentives for export promotion  are not  considered.  1.R. =  investment reserves; 
I.T.C. = investment tax credit; Spec. Deprec.  = special depreciation; T.H. = tax holidays. 
“Ratio of  tax reduction amount to gross investment. All incentives are converted to investment 
tax credit equivalent ratio. For example, the total benefit in  1963 is equivalent to having a 18.6 
percent investment tax credit. For further details of  computation, see Kwack (1986). 
“The selected years are when major tax reforms were effected 
‘Curb market interest rate is used as a proxy for discount rate. This rate may be interpreted as an 
upper limit. 
dSurtaxes to the corporate tax are not considered. 
cAssumed asset lifetime for tax purposes is 11 years, and assumed economic depreciation rate is 
11 percent. 
qnteraction and overlapping (some pairs of  incentives cannot be  adopted at the same time) of 
incentives were taken into account when the figures in the total column were calculated. 
was ad~pted.~  Finally, the social aspects of development began to attract pub- 
lic attention, with equity and balance stressed as values to be pursued with a 
higher priority. 
The most  significant tax  reform  in the early  1980s took place  in  1982. 
Though this measure did not involve a major overhaul as did reforms in the 
mid-l970s, it is particularly important. The reform lowered personal and cor- 
porate income tax rates, streamlined the industrial tax incentive system, and 
moved partway toward the “real-name system” (see sec. 5.4.2) for financial 
transactions. The intent of these changes was to bring the Korean tax system 
one step closer to an ideal  system of fairness and efficiency. In a practical 
sense, however, the streamlining  of  tax incentives was the most significant 
result of the reform. 
Under the announced principle of low taxes and low exemption, the 1982 
5.  In 1980, for the first time in Korea, a negative growth rate of  -4.8  percent was recorded. 
The wholesale price index jumped by  as much as 42 percent,  and the current account balance 
recorded a deficit of U.S  $5.3 billion (30.3 percent of the total amount of  annual exports). 123  Tax Reform in Korea 
tax reform revamped the incentive system drastically. Specifically, the liberal 
tax privileges of key industries were almost completely removed. The effects 
of  this measure can be observed in table 5.1. Incentives for research and de- 
velopment, and investment in  small and  medium firms were reinforced. In 
other words, the government adopted a “functional” or “indirect” approach, 
in contrast to the previous industry-specific or “direct” approach, in providing 
industrial incentives. 
The economy quickly stabilized and  showed steady growth through the 
mid-1980s. Other reform measures for liberalization and  structural adjust- 
ment were consistently implemented. Tax policy remained largely unchanged 
during the mid-l980s, however, although the demand for a fundamental tax 
reform in  response to drastically changing internal and  external conditions 
was very strong throughout the 1980s. This increasing demand led the govern- 
ment to establish the Commission on Tax  Reform in 1984. The first proposal 
of  the commission was submitted in 1985 and was allegedly reflected in the 
tax reform of 1988. That reform, however, was not a full embodiment of the 
commission’s proposals but a first response to the rapidly changing political 
and  social environment and  its needs. Subsequent tax reform was  mainly 
geared to coping with social and economic needs stemming from the extreme 
political changes of the past two to three years. Since such reforms are still in 
progress, we will discuss them separately in section 5.4. 
5.3  An Outline of the Current Tax System 
5.3.1  The Structure and Characteristics 
Currently, Korea has twenty-nine taxes, of  which fifteen are national (see 
the appendix). In terms of  revenue, the VAT  is the most important national 
tax, generating more than 20 percent of total tax revenue. Other major taxes 
are defense tax, personal income tax, corporate tax, and customs duties. Spe- 
cialized excise taxes (special excise, liquor, and telephone) are also important 
revenue generators. The revenue from local taxes is only 10 percent of total 
tax revenue, whereas the taxes on tobacco and on real estate acquisition and 
registration are significant.6 
The tax structure in Korea can be characterized by  its heavy reliance on 
indirect taxes. As presented in table 5.2, about 60 percent of total tax revenue 
is from indirect taxes. The dependence on indirect taxes has been criticized as 
6.  The distinction between central and local government has relatively little meaning in Korea. 
Although the country is administratively divided into six special cities and nine provinces, the 
heads at all levels of local government are directly appointed by the central government. Local 
autonomy was briefly in effect before the military coup d’6tat in 1961 but has not been reintro- 
duced. Thus,  Korea’s local governments have acted merely as agents carrying out the decisions of 
the central government. They have neither their own kinds of tax nor the power to change tax rates 
in response to the needs of local residents. 124  Taewon Kwack and Kye-Sik Lee 
Table 5.2  Direct and Indirect Tax Ratio (% of all taxes) 
Direct  Indirect 
1965  42.9  57.1 
1970  43.5  56.5 
1975  39.5  60.5 
1980  36.9  63.1 
1985  39.3  60.7 
1988  44.9  55.1 
Sources: Office of National Tax Administration 1982; Ministry of  Finance 1990. 
the major source of the regressive nature of the overall tax burden in Korea. 
This “inequitable” feature of the tax system may be more clearly demonstrated 
by the relatively insignificant role of the personal income tax (table 5.3). As 
of  1987, less than 2 percent of  GDP was collected as personal income tax, 
while in most Western countries the level (as of 1985) was around 10 percent. 
With such a low percentage, it is impossible to significantly affect the distri- 
bution of income through tax policies. 
There are a few reasons for the poor performance of personal income tax in 
Korea. First, though the marginal tax rate is very high and progressive,  the 
exemption level is also very high, and only about 40 percent of  workers pay 
income tax. Second, most interest income and about half of dividend income 
is taxed separately, at a low flat rate (10 percent, plus surcharges and 5 percent 
education tax). Third, capital gains from financial asset transactions are com- 
pletely  untaxed and those from real asset transactions are undertaxed.  Prob- 
ably most important, the level of income tax compliance and administration is 
very low. Proprietors’ income is especially notorious for escaping taxation. 
Revenue from taxes on wealth as a percentage of the total tax revenue of all 
governments at all levels is about 8.1 percent, which is quite low by interna- 
tional standards. 
5.3.2  Taxation on Income 
The individual  income tax  system  in  Korea  is  a  mixture  of  global  and 
schedular systems. Not all incomes are included in the global income calcu- 
7. It is difficult to construct a statistical proof for this assertion. However, this idea is generally 
accepted among Koreans, based on their personal experience. Another important indirect argu- 
ment for the assertion can be found in the following facts: An unincorporated firm whose annual 
sales are below 36 million won is eligible for the “special taxation” program of the VAT.  A firm 
eligible for this program is not required to keep books, and its VAT liability is 2 percent of total 
sales. This sales information is also used in estimating the firm’s income tax base, by applying the 
“standard income ratio.”  If  the ratio is  10 percent,  monthly taxable income of such a business 
owner is only 300,000 won, which is even lower than the starting salary of a typical high school- 
graduate worker. About 70 percent of  the unincorporated firms in Korea are covered under the 
special tax program. As a result, about 65 percent of proprietors belong to the zero bracket even 
though the personal exemption level for proprietors’ income is smaller than that for labor income. 125  Tax Reform in Korea 
Table 5.3  Tax Revenue Structure by ’Qpe of Taxes, 1985 (7% of GDP) 
Income  Consumption 
Social 
All  Personal  All  General  Property  Security 
Canada  15.0  12.0  10.7  4.5  3.2  4.5 
West Germany  13.1  10.8  9.7  6.0  1.1  13.8 
Sweden  21.2  19.5  13.3  7.0  1.2  14.7’ 
United Kingdom  14.8  9.9  12.0  6.0  4.6  6.7’ 
United States  12.3  10.3  5.1  2.1  2.9  8.4 
Japan  13.0  7.0  4.0  -  2.7  8.5 










Sources: OECD 1987; Bank of Korea 1989. 
‘Includes taxes on payroll and work force. 
lation. Global income comprises interest, dividends, real estate income, busi- 
ness income, and wages and salary and is taxed at a highly progressive rate, 
ranging from 5 to 50 percent, exclusive of surcharges.*  There are eight brack- 
ets, and the bracket for the top marginal rate is over 50 million won. Cur- 
rently, almost 100 percent of interest income and more than half of dividend 
income is taxed separately at 10 percent. (Inclusive of surcharges and 5 per- 
cent education tax, the effective rate ranges from 16.75 to 17.75 per~ent.)~ 
Retirement income, capital gains from sales of  real assets, and timber in- 
come are taxed under independent schedules. Tax rates for real capital gain 
from real assets range from 40 to 60 percent according to the size of the capital 
gain. Capital gains from the financial asset market are simply untaxed. In- 
come from agricultural land is taxed by  local governments at progressive 
rates. As noted previously, liberal deductions and exemptions are stipulated in 
the income tax law, and, as a result, about 60  percent of workers and 65 per- 
cent of proprietors belong to the zero bracket. 
Corporate incomes are taxed under the corporate tax. On up to 80 million 
won, the low rate of 20 percent is applied, and the excess is taxed at 30 per- 
cent.lo For large closed corporations, the high (marginal) rate is 33 percent. 
Capital gains from real property sales are uniquely treated. First they are taxed 
as normal corporate income, and then an “additional tax” of 25 to 35 percent 
is charged. This makes corporate capital gains taxes consistent with the high 
tax rate on capital gains of individuals. 
As previously mentioned, these taxes have been heavily used as policy tools 
8. The effective top marginal rate inclusive of defense tax (10-20  percent) and inhabitant tax 
(7.5 percent) is 63.75 percent. 
9. As a means to promote financial savings, income from major financial savings had  been 
almost untaxed until the mid-1970s. The current system of separate taxation of financial income 
provides incentives for saving and reflects the inability to identify taxable financial income under 
the system in which fictitious-name financial transactions are allowed. 
10.  Defense tax (20-25  percent) and inhabitant tax (7.5 percent) are surcharged on the corpo- 
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for a variety of  purposes. The exemptions and deductions of  the personal in- 
come and the corporation taxes were considerably reduced by the reform of 
1982, but various incentive measures such as accelerated depreciation, invest- 
ment tax credit, and tax-free reserves are still liberally used in promoting re- 
search and development investment, investment in small and medium indus- 
tries, and relocation of industries away from large metropolitan areas. 
The Korean tax system has not yet incorporated serious measures such as 
the imputation method to handle the problem of double taxation at corporate 
and personal  dividend  income levels.  A tax credit for dividend income has 
been  adopted  for this  purpose. More than  50 percent  of  dividend  income, 
however,  is taxed separately at a low rate, and therefore the double taxation 
problem has not been too serious. 
5.3.3  Consumption Taxes 
The current structure of the consumption tax system was completed in 1977 
when the VAT  was introduced.  The VAT  is the largest consumption  tax  in 
Korea.  Other consumption taxes  are the special excise, liquor,  telephone, 
stamp, and tobacco sales. In terms of revenue, the tobacco sales tax, which is 
the only local tax among consumption taxes, the special excise tax, and the 
liquor tax are particularly important. 
The Korean VAT is a typical European Community type with a flat rate of 
10 percent and zero rating. To  the small firms that have difficulty in bookkeep- 
ing, the “special taxation” system is applied. Under this system, eligible firms 
are taxed on a turnover basis; they pay 2 percent of their gross sales amount 
rather than  10 percent of  their value-added  amount. Because  more than  70 
percent of VAT payers are under the special taxation system, the merits of the 
VAT are not fully exploited. 
The special excise tax was first introduced to mitigate the presumed regres- 
sivity of the single-rated VAT.  Currently thirty-six items (single commodity, 
groups of similar commodity, or services) are taxed at rates ranging from 10 
to  100 percent.”  Incidence of  this tax  is estimated  to be  significantly  less 
regressive, compared with the VAT.’* Liquor taxes are ad valorem in Korea, 
ranging from 10 to 300 percent. Tobacco production and sales were monopo- 
lized  by  the government until  very  recently,  when  the  business  unit  was 
changed to a public corporation. Previously, the profit from the government 
monopoly was included as an indirect tax revenue of the central government, 
but currently,  similar revenue  is generated  by  local government taxation  of 
tobacco consumption. 
5.3.4 
At the national level, the inheritance and gift tax has been the most impor- 
tant tax on property transfers, though the revenue from it has been negligible. 
Taxation on Property Ownership and Transfers 
11.  Only gasoline and Turkish baths are taxed at  100 percent. Most items are taxed at 10 to 2.5 
12.  See Lee and Bae (1987) for a comprehensive incidence study of indirect taxes in Korea. 
percent, and a few items are taxed at 30,40,  or 60 percent. 127  Tax Reform in Korea 
Taxes on capital gains from real property transactions can also be categorized 
as taxes on property transfers. Capital gains taxes were created to control real 
estate speculation in the mid-1960s but now  are incorporated in  the income 
tax law and corporate tax law as discussed above.I3  Recently, a tax on excess 
profit from land was introduced. This tax is a selective capital gains tax levied 
on an accrual basis. We  will discuss this tax and related recent legislation in 
section 5.4. 
The inheritance tax in Korea is not a true inheritance tax but an estate tax.I4 
Gifts or inter vivos transfers are taxed separately unless such transfers take 
place within a three-year period before the death of the donor. In such a case, 
the gift amount is added to the estate tax base. The gift tax base is calculated 
by  accumulating the inter vivos transfers from a donor for three consecutive 
years. Both taxes have highly progressive rate schemes, ranging from 5 to 55 
percent for the inheritance tax and 5 to 60 percent for the gift tax. In addition, 
a 20 percent defense tax is surcharged on both taxes. Exemption levels are not 
very high. 
These taxes, in spite of such high rates and strictness in other aspects, have 
generated insignificant revenue. This fact is the most obvious evidence that 
they have not contributed significantly to redistributing wealth. The most no- 
table reason for such poor performance has been, among other things, the 
unrealistically low assessment of assets. 
Local  governments tax  property holdings,  acquisition, and  registration. 
Currently, the property tax is applied to buildings and construction, mining 
lots, aircraft, and vessels; the landholdings are taxed under the global land- 
holding tax, which came into effect in 1990. We  will discuss this tax in some 
detail in section 5.4. The acquisition tax and the registration tax have  been 
important revenue sources for local governments. 
5.4  Current Tax Reform Issues 
5.4.1  Recent Sociopolitical Changes and Emphasis on Equity and Balance 
The late 1980s may be considered one of the most important turning points 
in Korea’s modernization. In spite of economic success in the 1980% the Ko- 
13.  It  is not clear why tax measures have been preferred in coping with land speculation in 
Korea. We guess the following reasons are important. First, Korean financial markets were not 
working efficiently. Second, land speculation in Korea has been looked at as a social sin, and the 
policymakers seem to have thought that those who speculate on land deserve a heavy tax as a 
penalty. Third, as a short term emergency measure to scare away speculators from the overheated 
real estate market, tax measures sound more powerful than financial measures. Fourth, a financial 
squeeze not only affects the real estate market but also hampers industrial investment. Policymak- 
ers wanted to redirect loanable funds from unproductive real estate speculation to productive in- 
dustrial investment. In other words, some selective measures were preferred. 
14. The legal description of this tax is not perfectly clear, and, indeed, a few scholars claim 
that the Inheritance and Gift Tax Law is an inheritance tax. But the majority of scholars in this 
field agree that it is an estate tax as described in the law, which is the official interpretation. For a 
detailed discussion on this matter, see Choi (1990). 128  Taewon Kwack and Kye-Sik Lee 
rean citizens’ resentment against Chunk dictatorial regime grew rapidly, and 
in early 1987 it burst out in violent protests. The “June 29 Declaration” of the 
ruling party,  which  promised  a drastic  “democratization”  including a direct 
election of the next president, calmed the protest. The abrupt removal of var- 
ious controls, however, resulted in social disruption and difficulties of differ- 
ent kinds. Extremely extensive and violent labor unrest hit the economy from 
the second half of 1987 on. Not only workers but farmers, street vendors, the 
urban poor, and other groups marched the streets to make their voices heard. 
Fortunately,  the  economy  of  the  country  was  extremely  healthy,  with 
double-digit growth rates, large and unprecedented trade surpluses, and per- 
fect price stability. The Korean public, who had believed that they were per- 
sonally  indebted  when  the national  debt was  an  economic issue in  earlier 
years,  naturally  believed  that  they  deserved  shares  in  the  large  trade  sur- 
pluses.’5 Specifically, the relatively underprivileged classes began to cry out 
for equity and balance. They asked the government to secure the awarding of 
their due shares, which had been suspended until “the pie grew large enough.” 
The presidential  election and the general election  for representatives of  the 
National Assembly  were carried out with severe and confusing competition 
among four major parties.  All  the  parties  and  candidates  offered  fantastic 
promises, inflating the expectations of the public. Under the new constitution, 
President Roh Tae Woo was elected and inaugurated in  1988, but the ruling 
party failed to secure the majority in the National Assembly. 
5.4.2  Tax Reform Experiments under a “Democratized” Environment 
These social and political changes exercised enormous influence both on 
policy-making  processes  and  policy  objectives  themselves.  First,  popular 
voices and various interest groups gained much power, whereas the influence 
of  the technocrats and specialists weakened. Public hearings and opinion sur- 
veys about policy-making  became  much more frequent. Second, equity  in 
income and wealth  distribution  and balance  in development among regions 
and sectors became  the prime policy objectives.  Recent tax  reforms reflect 
these changes vividly. 
Income Taxation and Equity 
Income taxation in Korea, in spite of  its highly progressive rate structure, 
has not contributed significantly to distributive equity. Reducing the tax bur- 
den of low-income workers, however, seems to make a powerful and attractive 
political catchphrase at any time. Such tax reform was promised by all com- 
peting parties in the elections and was implemented in the  1988 tax reform. 
Though officially it was the first major reform carried out in response to the 
proposals  that  the  tax  reform committee made in  1985, in  effect  most  of 
15. Various policy forums had active debates during 1987-88  on how to use the “trade sur- 
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the changes were administrative or technical, and few were major. One of the 
important features of the reform was an increase in the personal exemption 
level of the income tax. Other major changes were reduction in the number of 
brackets and the marginal tax rates of the income tax and the inheritance tax, 
downward adjustment in many excise tax rates, a large-scale upward adjust- 
ment of the limit below which the special taxation system of the VAT is appli- 
cable, and reduction of  some incentives for exports and inducement of foreign 
capital. 
Income tax reform in 1988, ostensibly to help the poor working class, ac- 
tually  undermined the already  narrow  base  of  the income tax  system and 
might negatively affect distributive equity in the long run. The majority of the 
workers were not paying any income tax, and the reform increased the size of 
this  group. By reducing  the tax  rate without  any other compensating  mea- 
sures,  the income tax burden  of  the upper-bracket  families  was visibly  re- 
duced. The tax revenue in general was expected to be reduced,  limiting the 
expansion of  welfare-related programs for low-income families. 
Ironically, the income tax revenue in 1989 substantially exceeded the bud- 
get and the figure predicted  by the govemment.I6 In the event,  most news- 
papers  in  Seoul printed  editorials  and columns saying that  the “excessive” 
collected  revenue  should  be refunded. Very hot  debates  on this  matter fol- 
lowed, subsiding  after a while without any clear-cut conclusions.  Since the 
“real-name system” is officially suspended, a further reduction of  the income 
tax is being considered by  the policy  a~thorities.~’  The income tax base in 
Korea is thus continually pared down by political motives. 
“Public  Concept” of  Landownership and Land Use 
The centerpiece of the recent tax reform issues in Korea is how to control 
land speculation through tax measures.  Land speculation has been a serious 
economic and social problem  in Korea almost from the beginning of indus- 
trialization.  In  the  mid- 1960s, the  land-speculation-control  tax  was  intro- 
duced, but land speculation caused various problems throughout the  1970s. 
After a series of strong stabilization measures in the early 1980s, asset market 
inflation seemed to be held under control. In recent years, however, specula- 
tion in real assets has resumed all over the country. One important reason for 
this drastic increase is an excessive increase in liquidity supply, due to balance 
of payment surpluses. Another factor is the elections; they not only contrib- 
uted to the increase  in the liquidity supply but also actively stimulated land 
16. There are a few reasons for this excess. The business conditions were extremely good. 
Nominal wage level increased dramatically as a result of good business conditions and extensive 
labor unrest. And the budget officers seem to have been too conservative in estimating the revenue 
implications of the reform. 
17. We  will say more about the “real-name system’’ later. Introduction of this system has been 
associated with a heavier taxation of  income from financial assets of high-income-class house- 
holds. Therefore, to balance the suspension of the introduction of the system, many argued, labor 
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speculation when politicians announced blueprints for numerous development 
projects to be carried out when elected. In addition, industrial investment be- 
came extremely unattractive mainly because of the skyrocketing cost of labor, 
including the psychic cost of violence by workers. As a result, capital owners 
began to seek a safe and easy way  of  making money or at least of  safely 
hoarding their wealth. The public, losing confidence in  the stability of  the 
value of  money, began to escape from financial assets. The real demand for 
housing was  also increasing because of  the rapidly rising  income level  of 
middle-class workers. The real estate market simply exploded. 
Even before this explosion, the government was seriously concerned about 
the concentration of the distribution of real assets and the severe shortage of 
urban land for housing and business. Since inflation in the real estate market 
has been far exceeding that in the commodity markets, the skewed distribu- 
tion of  land and buildings is the single most important source of  the ever- 
widening gap between the haves and the have-nots. The rapidly rising cost of 
housing, when the supply of  urban housing is far short of the desired level, 
could cause serious social instability. Under these conditions, the government 
planned to introduce a strong system to fight real estate speculation. In Sep- 
tember 1988, an ad hoc committee to study the “public concept” of the own- 
ership of land was established to draft a proposal on various measures to deal 
with pending land problems. At  the same time, the government announced 
that it would introduce a global landholding tax. The global landholding tax 
and three other measures proposed by  the “public concept” committee were 
enacted in 1990. 
As part of the effort to control land speculation, the government announced 
a schedule to raise the landholding tax assessment to 60 percent of the actual 
market price by  1992. One of  the major reasons for poor performance of 
property-related taxes was unrealistically low  and extremely uneven assess- 
ment of real assets for tax purposes. A survey by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
reported that the average assessment for property tax was 23 percent of  the 
actual value in Seoul and 46.2 percent in Kyungbuk province as of  1988. The 
assessment ratio varied among different regions and among different uses or 
types of land (Lee 1988, 37-39).  In addition, several “official” prices of land 
were assessed by different organizations for different public policy purposes. 
As a practical measure to provide a unified and realistic assessment of land 
to be used for various policy purposes, a new system for assessing land and 
announcing the results to the public was introduced in  1989. It is expected 
that the administration of  the property-related taxes will  be  improved and 
strengthened substantially as a result. 
The introduction of the new assessment system and the plan for the upward 
adjustment of the assessment ratio may  be considered complementary mea- 
sures of  the new  system on landholding enacted in 1990. A global land tax, 
under which the property tax operates as a personal tax with a progressive rate 
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As early as 1973, a tax measure to deal with  speculative holding of  real 
property was introduced.  Penalty rates on luxurious real properties and on 
unused urban land were introduced in the property tax system. A progressive 
property tax rate scheme ranging from 0.3 to 5 percent (raised to 7 percent 
later)  on  houses  was  introduced  in  1974.  This  system became  a partially 
global personal property tax system in 1988. As an excessive-landholding tax, 
the system applied progressive tax rates of  1 to 5 percent on the value of a 
person’s local holding of unused urban land. This measure was felt inadequate 
to control the ever-increasing demand for landholding and to satisfy public 
demand for equity and social reform.  Opinions claiming that public control 
over landholding and use must be reinforced seemed to gain public support. 
As a result,  a full-fledged  global landholding tax  and other rather  extreme 
measures to control speculative landholding were introduced. 
Under the global landholding tax (the aggregate land tax) system, all land 
owned by individuals and corporations is classified in three ways: (1) proper- 
ties to be taxed under the main global scheme, (2) properties to be taxed under 
the secondary global scheme, and (3) properties to be taxed separately at flat 
rates. 
The first group includes most of the properties previously taxed under the 
excessive-landholding  tax at progressive rates ranging from 0.2 percent  for 
the base which is less than 5 million won, to 5 percent for more than 5 billion 
won. The second group is mainly  composed of  commercially used land. In 
this case, the highest marginal tax rate is 2 percent, and the tax bases are much 
wider, the maximum base being above 30 billion  won.  The third group in- 
cludes properties,  owned by a single individual or a corporation, to be taxed 
at low flat rates (0.1 to 0.3 percent) or at a very high rate (5 percent) depend- 
ing on the type of use, regardless of the size. 
This tax, though  a personal tax, is administered as a local  tax. The tax 
liability of  each taxpayer is calculated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, but 
collection is the responsibility of local governments, each of which collects a 
proportional  share from a single individual in case a taxpayer owns land in 
multiple jurisdictions.  This unique  feature of  the tax may cause significant 
administrative difficulties in the future. In addition, this tax depends critically 
on the judgment of the tax administrator in classifying specific properties. 
Another important tax measure enacted in 1990 to deal with land specula- 
tion is the excessive-land-profit tax. This tax is levied on “excessive” capital 
gains accrued to landholdings.Ig Under this system, accrued net capital gains 
(net of capital expenditure on the land) in excess of normal gains, that is, in 
excess of  the  national  average rate of land  price  increase,  is taxed  at a 50 
18.  Possible reasons for the bias toward tax measures in coping with land speculation are men- 
tioned in footnote 13. Even the “public concept” committee did not propose any financial measure 
to fight real asset inflation. 
19.  A similar tax system had been introduced in  Korea in the  1967 tax reform but was imme- 
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percent rate every three years. Different percentages (40-80  percent) of  the 
tax may be credited to the existing capital gains tax, depending on the length 
of time between the levy of  the excessive-land-profit tax and the sale of  the 
land. This system critically depends on the accuracy and fairness of the as- 
sessment of all land as well as on the judgment of the tax authority about the 
utilization of each piece of land. 
Although not exactly a tax issue, the most debated “public concept” issue 
during the past couple of years was whether a ceiling should be established on 
the holding of  residential land. Those who opposed the introduction of  the 
ceiling emphasized the constitutional right of property ownership and disposal 
as well as the market system of resource allocation, while those for the ceiling 
emphasized the public sentiment on land issues, the shortage of housing, and 
the extreme concentration of  landholding. According to the latter group, by 
sacrificing a handful of large landholders, social justice could be greatly en- 
hanced, benefiting the majority. A few polls confirmed the public sentiment 
in favor of  the ceiling. The National Assembly eventually passed a bill to 
establish a ceiling on the holding of residential land in city areas, which was 
partially enacted in 1990.20 
The third system proposed by the “public concept” committee and adopted 
by  the National Assembly was the system to retake development profits. Ac- 
cording to this system, a land developer pays 50 percent of the evaluated profit 
from the project to the government. 
“Real-Name System” of  Financial Transactions 
Another pillar of the reform debates during recent years has been the so- 
called real-name system of financial transactions. In fact, it is an “old’ issue. 
In 1961, the capital-hungry military government introduced a system in which 
financial transactions under fictitious names were allowed, to encourage fi- 
nancial saving. The anonymity system had long been criticized for generating 
inequities in the tax burden and providing a safe harbor for curb market activ- 
ities, the most typical underground economic activity in  Korea. It had not 
been an urgent issue, however, until a national financial scandal was disclosed 
in 1982. A number of leading corporations were involved in a combination of 
fraud and curb market financial transactions. The shock of the incident gave 
strength to the cry for introduction of a forced real-name system. In the same 
year, the law disallowing fictitious-name financial transactions was passed by 
the National Assembly, with a proviso that the implementation of the system 
would be suspended until the economy had gained sufficient strength and the 
administration was  prepared.  The  authority  to  implement the  system was 
given to the president. 
20.  Under this system, a household unit cannot hold residential land in excess of  660  square 
meters in six major city areas. Those who want to hold in excess of the limit must pay annually 7 
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Over the past several years, however, the government has failed to launch 
the system. In the presidential election in  1987, all candidates promised to 
activate the system when elected. In due course, the government announced 
the schedule to implement the system and established a working group in the 
Ministry of Finance. From the second half of  1989 on, in spite of the sched- 
uled  introduction of  the  “public  concept” systems,  real  asset  prices  sky- 
rocketed and the stock market slid steeply down. In particular, price increases 
in the housing market were formidable. In addition, the real economy was 
performing very poorly in  1989 and did not improve in  1990. Facing such 
conditions, the government cancelled the scheduled activation of  the system 
early in 1990 and instead is concentrating on the fight against real asset infla- 
tion. 
5.5  Pending Issues and Prospects 
A number of  important issues are oppressing the Korean economy. The 
industrial sector is in the midst of a drastic structural adjustment. The leading 
export sectors are rapidly losing their competitiveness in  international mar- 
kets, due mainly to dramatically increasing labor cost. The agricultural sector, 
which  includes about one-fifth of  the population, cannot be easily restruc- 
tured. At the same time, the public’s inflated expectations must be taken care 
of somehow. Macroeconomic stability is very seriously threatened. 
All these problems are important and urgent, but politically the public de- 
mand for justice and equity or a “social reform” seems to be the top policy 
concern. The government and the ruling party try to show their willingness to 
“reform” by proposing tax reforms. There is little likelihood of achieving this 
goal through reform of income taxation unless the real-name system is imple- 
mented in the near future. Even if the system is enacted successfully, however, 
it is clear that it will not immediately bring equitable income taxation. 
Equity and balance may be pursued by increasing transfer expenditures and 
other social programs. This approach, however, requires increased govern- 
ment revenue. Over the past several years, government plans to raise the tax/ 
GNP ratio moderately have not been successful. It is not likely that the gov- 
ernment will reform the tax  system to raise revenue substantially in the near 
future, mainly because it is not politically rewarding. To the contrary, outspo- 
ken political pressure is forcing the government to further cut taxes on labor 
income. In addition, industries are demanding tax cuts to facilitate smooth 
structural adjustment. 
The demand for reform can be satisfied in large part by  stabilizing the real 
estate market and eliminating speculation. Currently, the government is both 
persuading and threatening large corporations to dispose of  their excessive 
real properties. This is only a stopgap, and permanent and truly effective pol- 
icies should be introduced. As noted above, radical tax measures have already 
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prices increased even more rapidly after strong antispeculation measures were 
announced. It is quite clear that the public either do not believe in the consist- 
ency of the government in pursuing certain policy goals or do not understand 
the effects of the new systems. 
The most challenging and important issues in the area of tax policy in the 
coming years, we believe, will be to operate the property-related tax systems 
effectively and smoothly and to reinforce them, rather than introducing new 
systems. 135  Tax Reform in Korea 
Appendix 
Table 5A.1  The Tax Structure in Korea (%) 










































































87.7  82.2 
54.8  60.9 
11.1  11.3 
8.5  11.7 
0.3  0.5 
0.1  0.2 
0.0  0.0 
21.8  26.2 
7.4  4.7 
3.8  3.1 
1.3  0.8 
0.6  0.6 
0.1  1.8 
11.8  7.1 
14.9  14.2 
12.5  12.5 
2.4  1.7 
6.2  - 
12.3  17.8 
10.6  16.3 
2.6  2.6 
2.7  3.3 
0.2  0.2 
1.5  1.8 
1.8  0.7 
0.9  1.3 
1.2 
0.1  0.0 
0.1  0.1 
0.1  0.1 
0.6  5.0 
1.7  1.5 
0.9  0.7 
0.3  0.3 
0.5  0.5 
100.0  100.0 
- 
Sources: Economic Planning Board 1989,  1990. 136  Taewon Kwack and Kye-Sik Lee 
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